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1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
its holding in La Carrubba, the anomaly exists that indictments
alleging violations of clearly inherent duties may survive, provided
no reference is made to a violation of canonical provisions. 5 '
Thomas M. Cerabino
Statements of victim in response to inquiries deemed spontaneous
declarations
The spontaneous declaration exception 38 to the rule against
hearsay evidence, 311 often imprecisely viewed as falling within the
res gestae doctrine,3 0 renders statements spontaneously uttered
and the other enables the evident purposes of the Legislature to be effectuated, the
latter is preferred.
Id.
An evidently broad legislative purpose seems to have been enunciated in this regard.
3 Consequently, under the La Carrubba holding, an indictment not specifically refer-
ring to the Code of Judicial Conduct, but describing conduct or omissions in violation of one
of its provisions, may survive a challenge of insufficiency under § 195.00(2). Notwithstanding
La Carrubba's potential for creating such technical distinctions, where an indictment does
not incorporate by reference the Code of Judicial Conduct, the availability of § 195.00(2) in
cases of judicial nonfeasance should not be precluded. Clarification of the scope of this
provision by the legislature ultimately may be essential for its proper interpretation.
See note 361 and accompanying text infra.
' The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements from evidence only when they are
used to establish the truth of their content. E. FIscH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 756, at 446 (2d
ed. 1977); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDEN § 200, at 176 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). See generally
Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138, 1139-45 (1935). Thus, extra-
judicial declarations that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not
subject to the prohibition of the hearsay rule. See Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P.2d 425
(1937); W. RICHARDSON, supra, § 203, at 180; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1745 (3d ed. 1940);
32 CORNELL L.Q. 115, 115-16 (1946). The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay
testimony is the unavailability of cross-examination to test its strength and accuracy. See
W. RICHARDSON, supra, § 201; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra, §§ 1361-62.
People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698
(1975); see E. FISCH, supra note 359, § 1001, at 579-80; W. RICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 281,
at 246-48. Res gestae literally means "the thing done." Id. at § 279. Unfortunately, a precise
definition of the term, as it is applied in the law of evidence, has not been formulated because
it has been used by the courts in a variety of factual circumstances. Id. One of the situations
in which the res gestae principle is invoked involves ambiguous conduct that requires an
explanation in order to be given a specific legal effect. Commonly referred to as the "verbal
act" doctrine, this rule of evidence authorizes the admission of a statement that accompanies
and characterizes a particular transaction. See E. FiSCH, supra note 359, § 762, at 452; W.
RICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 280, at 244-45; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1772, at 190-
91. For example, a transfer of money can be effected for several reasons and therefore is, by
itself, equivocal conduct. If at the same time, however, the transferor says, "Here is the
money I borrowed from you," the transaction can be construed as constituting the repayment
of a loan. See E. FIscH, supra note 359, § 762, at 452. To be admissible under the verbal act
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:137
under the influence of a shocking event admissible as evidence of
the truth of their contents.36 1 The foundation for the exception lies
in the assumption that the declarant, startled by the excitement of
the moment, is unable to reflect or deliberate and therefore to fabri-
cate."2 Notwithstanding the inherent trustworthiness of spontan-
eous declarations, it was unclear whether statements made in re-
sponse to a question were covered by the exception.3 13 In People v.
Edwards,34 the Court of Appeals recently resolved a 66-year-old
conflict in precedent,"' holding that a statement elicited by an in-
quiry is admissible if the "surrounding circumstances demonstrate
that the utterance was instinctive. '" 36
Defendant Edwards, who previously had resided with the vic-
principle, according to Professor Fisch, four requirements must be satisfied: "1) the conduct
must be equivocal, 2) the words must accompany the conduct, 3) and aid in giving legal
significance to the conduct, and 4) the conduct characterized by the words must be indepen-
dently relevant to the issue." Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).
In most cases, the verbal act doctrine is not used as a true exception to the rule against
hearsay because the declaration is admitted only to explain the nature of an act in issue and
not to establish the truth of its content. W. ICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 280, at 245.
"I E.g., People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230-31, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d
695, 698-99 (1975); People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71-73, 160 N.E.2d 26, 27-29, 188 N.Y.S.2d
465, 467-70 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 483,
85 N.E. 690, 695 (1908); E. FIscH, supra note 359, § 1000, at 576-77; W. IbCHARDSON, supra
note 359, § 281, at 246-48; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, §§ 1745-50. Since the spontaneous
declaration is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is a real exception to the
hearsay rule. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, §§ 1745-46, at 132-34. See generally note 359
supra.
311 See note 361 supra. The spontaneity of the declaration does not depend solely upon
the time it was uttered, the dispositive factor being the declarant's inability to deliberate.
People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71-72, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-68 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 483, 85 N.E. 690, 695 (1908).
Therefore, statements made after the occurrence are also admissible, provided they were
spoken under the excitement of the event. Id.
Professor Wigmore traces the recognition of the spontaneous declaration exception to the
1693 case of Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 1057 (K.B. 1693). 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 359, § 1746, at 135. The modem decisions generally consider five elements in determining
spontaneity: the time the statement was made, the place at which it was uttered, the form
of the statement, whether it was made in response to an inquiry and the physical condition
of the declarant. Note, Spontaneous Declarations - New York Rule, 10 BROOKLYN L. REv.
280, 282 (1941).
3,3 Compare Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913) with People
v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690 (1908).
34 47 N.Y.2d 493, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1979), aff'g 63 App. Div. 2d 866,
405 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
35 See note 380 infra.
311 47 N.Y.2d at 499, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48. As was noted by the Court,
this decision puts New York in accordance with the vast majority of jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue of the spontaneity of responsive declarations. Id. at 498 n.2, 392 N.E.2d
at 1232 n.2, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48 n.2.
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tim and her husband, supported himself as a sidewalk vendor in
front of their apartment building. 6 ' On the day of the murder,
Charles Simpson, the brother and neighbor of the 72-year-old vic-
tim, heard muffled screams from his sister's apartment and in-
quired through the closed door, "What is the matter, Edna?" The
victim replied, "Please help me get out . . . .Mr. Eddie is trying
to kill me." Further inquiry of the victim by her brother led to the
identification of the assailant as "Eddie, Rudy's brother down-
stairs." '368 After considerable effort," 9 Simpson forced the door open
and, while dragging his sister to the hallway, she warned, "Don't go
in there." Again he asked, "What is the matter?" and the victim
responded, "Eddie will kill you. '30 At the defendant's trial, his
objection that the victim's statements were "distinctly narrative"3 '
and, therefore, inadmissible hearsay, was overruled, and he was
convicted of murder in the second degree.3 2 The Appellate Division,
First Department, affirmed without opinion. 33
In affirming, a unanimous Court of Appeals held that the state-
ments of the victim were admitted properly as spontaneous declara-
tions or, more accurately, excited utterances, '3 74 even though they
were made in response to questions.375 Writing for the Court, Chief
Judge Cooke emphasized that the essential feature of the exception
is the trustworthiness of declarations made while the deliberative
capacities of the declarant have been overcome by a startling oc-
currence. 37 1 Finding that it "would serve no useful purpose" to bar
- Id. at 495, 392 N.E.2d at 1230, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 46. In his business of selling waterme-
Ion slices, the defendant used a knife and an ice pick. Id.
" Id. at 495-96, 392 N.E.2d at 1230, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
" Id. Mr. Simpson's initial efforts caused the door to open slightly, but it was immedi-
ately slammed closed and locked. Id.
310 Id. Immediately after the crime, the defendant was seen running down the fire escape.
A knife and an ice pick handle were found in a flower pot on the fire escape. Id.
"' Id. at 498, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48. See generally note 383 and accom-
panying text infra.
3, Id. at 495, 392 N.E.2d at 1230, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 46; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1974).
31 People v. Edwards, 63 App. Div. 2d 866, 405 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
'" Noting the "constantly changing nomenclature" of the exception, the Court observed
that the original term res gestae had been supplanted in favor of "a spontaneous declaration
uttered in response to a startling event." 47 N.Y.2d at 496-97 n.1, 392 N.E.2d at 1231 n.1,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 47 n.1 (citations omitted). The Court suggested that the term "excited
utterance," as used in the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EvID. 803(2), and the Model
Code of Evidence, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RuLE 512, might be "more appropriate." 47
N.Y.2d at 496-97 n.1, 392 N.E.2d at 1231 n.1, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47 n.1.
75 47 N.Y.2d at 497-99, 392 N.E.2d at 1231-32, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47-48.
378 See id. at 497, 392 N.E.2d at 1231, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47; note 362 and accompanying
text supra.
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the admission of an excited utterance merely because it was elicited
by an inquiry,377 the Edwards Court ruled that the fact that the
declaration was prompted by a question is only one element to be
considered in the ultimate determination of spontaneity. 38 Any in-
terpretation of precedent to the contrary was disapproved by the
Court.37
In focusing on the unique reliability of statements made under
the stress of an alarming experience, the Edwards Court has suc-
ceeded in clarifying the inconsistent and often erroneous approaches
to spontaneous declarations. " ' Apparently the result of an inclina-
3, 47 N.Y.2d at 499, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
3 Id.; see note 384 infra. The Court pointed out that, if the question or the person asking
it influences the response or if the inquiry is made a considerable length of time after the
exciting occurrence, "the declarations might very well lack the inherent reliability basic to
the rule." 47 N.Y.2d at 499, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
31 47 N.Y.2d at 499, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48 (citing People v. Sprague,
217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916); Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E.
527 (1913)).
311 See 47 N.Y.2d at 497, 392 N.E.2d at 1231, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47. Compare People v.
Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690 (1908) with Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y.
135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913) and Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 252 App. Div. 142,
297 N.Y.S. 216 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd per curiam, 277 N.Y. 548, 13 N.E.2d 468 (1938). In Del
Vermo, the declarant had been walking with a friend and the defendant late at night. Sud-
denly, the defendant ran off and, after taking a few steps, the declarant slumped to the
pavement. When his friend asked him, "What was the matter?," the declarant responded,
"Del Vermo stabbed me with a knife." 192 N.Y. at 476, 85 NXE. at 692. The Court admitted
the statement into evidence as a spontaneous declaration without mentioning that it was
made in answer to the inquiry of a witness. Id. at 483, 85 N.E. at 695. Del Vermo was the
first Court of Appeals decision to recognize the distinction between the spontaneous declara-
tion exception and the vague res gestae doctrine. See People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 72, 160
N.E. 2d 26, 28, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468-69 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); 6 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1745. See generally notes 358-362 and accompanying text supra.
The Del Vermo Court "observed that this exception contemplates and permits proof of
declarations by an injured person made after the event, so that it cannot fairly be said that
the words spoken really constituted a part of the thing done." 192 N.Y. at 483, 85 N.E. at
695.
The Greener Court, on the other hand, refused to admit an excited utterance elicited by
a question on the ground that it merely was an explanation of a past occurrence. 209 N.Y. at
138, 102 N.E. at 528. Greener was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of an employee
who had died from injuries suffered when he fell from a ladder in the defendant's plant. Id.
at 136-37, 102 N.E. at 527-28. Immediately after the fall, another employee who had witnessed
the accident asked the injured person what had happened. Id. at 137, 102 N.E. at 528. The
Court refused to allow the response to the effect that the ladder had broken to be admitted
as a spontaneous declaration. Id. at 138, 102 N.E. at 528. Stating that in Del Vermo the
declaration was admitted "'as part of the res gestae, in the broadest sense of the term'" the
Greener Court reasoned:
The distinction to be made is in the character of the declaration; whether it
be so spontaneous, or natural, an utterance as to exclude the idea of fabrication;
or whether it be in the nature of a narrative of what had occurred. In the present
case, the declaration of the deceased was not spontaneous; it was called forth by
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tion to impose the contemporaneity requirement of the res gestae
doctrine 38' on the spontaneous declaration exception, 82 several
courts had refused to admit excited utterances elicited by a question
the inquiry as to "what had happened" and was, distinctly, narrative. As it was
observed in the dissenting opinion below, "it was, in effect, a statement that the
falling was not accidental, nor due to the negligence of the plaintiffs intestate, but
was due to an occurrence upon which might be predicated negligence upon the part
of the defendant."
Id. at 138, 102 N.E. at 528; see People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 483, 85 N.E. 690, 695
(1908); Waldele v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 95 N.Y. 274 (1884). Although the
Greener Court was somewhat enigmatic in its reference to the exculpatory form of the declar-
ant's statement, it appears the fact that it was prompted by a question was the dispositive
circumstance of the case. See People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 378-79, 111 N.E. 1077, 1079
(1916); People v. Chapman, 191 App. Div. 660, 666, 181 N.Y.S. 750, 754 (3d Dep't 1920). See
also 32 CoRNLL L.Q. 115, 120 (1946); 54 MICH. L. REv. 133, 136 n.15 (1955); 31 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1100, 1108-10 (1956).
The disposition of Svendsen v. Frank McWilliams, Inc., 157 App. Div. 474, 142 N.Y.S.
606 (2d Dep't 1913), aff'd per curiam, 214 N.Y. 621, 108 N.E. 1109 (1915), supports the
inference that Greener turned on the inquiry by a witness. In Svendsen, the plaintiff brought
a personal injury action alleging negligence of the defendant's agent. The plaintiff, who had
fallen while working on a ship in drydock, demanded of defendant's agent "how he could be
so foolish" as to turn the rudder while plaintiff "was hanging on to it." 157 App. Div. at 476,
142 N.Y.S. at 607. The statement was made while the plaintiff, who was caught by the agent,
was still in the agent's arms. Id. The only apparent difference between this exclamation and
the exclamation in Greener was the absence of an inquiry. Nevertheless, the out-of-court
statement was held to be admissible as a spontaneous declaration and part of the res gestae,
id. at 479, 142 N.Y.S. at 609, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without further comment.
214 N.Y. 621, 108 N.E. 1109 (1915).
181 The res gestae principle, which generally is not a true exception to the hearsay rule,
authorizes the admission of statements that form part of a transaction in order to explain
the nature of the act. See note 360 supra. To come within the doctrine, the declaration must
be made contemporaneously with the transaction. Id. In contrast with the res gestae concept,
spontaneous declarations are admissible because, constituting uncalculated responses to an
exciting event, they are considered highly trustworthy. See notes 361 & 362 and accompany-
ing text supra.
= See E. FIscH, supra note 359, § 1001, at 579; 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1100, 1108-10 (1956).
It appears, however, that the Court gradually has sought to correct this result. For example,
despite the tendency in the older cases to focus on whether the declaration was made contem-
poraneously with the event in issue, see note 383 infra, later decisions have acknowledged that
the essential element of the exception is the inability to deliberate under the influence of an
alarming occurrence. See People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 231, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379
N.Y.S.2d 695, 699 (1975); People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71-72, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28, 188
N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-69 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960). Indeed, in People v. Caviness,
38 N.Y.2d 227, 342 N.E.2d 496, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1975), the Court recognized that a startling
event can produce an excited utterance in anyone who witnesses it and held, therefore, that
the spontaneous statements of a nonparticipant are also admissible. Id. at 231-32, 342 N.E.2d
at 499-500, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 700. The Court stated:
"Assuming that the non-participant is shown to have had adequate opportunity to
observe the event, there is no sound reason why his spontaneous exclamation should
not be admitted, for the unexpected exciting event may just as effectively produce
a natural and spontaneous declaration by a bystander as by a participant."
Id. (quoting W. RICHARDSON, supra note 359, § 284, at 250-51).
1979]
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on the ground that they merely were narrative explanations of past
occurences235 Since the Edwards Court has made it clear that the
time of the utterance is important only as one factor in determining
its spontaneity, 34 it is submitted that the Court impliedly has repu-
diated the use of a narrative standard when analyzing spontaneous
declarations.38 5 Consequently, in evaluating the admissibility of
spontaneous declarations, it would appear that the criteria set forth
in Edwards should replace the conclusory narrative test."'
1 209 N.Y. at 138, 102 N.E. at 528. The narrative standard was enunciated in Waldele
v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 95 N.Y. 274 (1884). In Waldele, the statements of
a deaf mute using sign language made 30 minutes after he had been run down by a train were
held inadmissible as not part of the res gestae. Id. at 276-77. The Court stated:
The claim that the declarations can be treated as part of the res gestae is not
supported by authority in this State. The res gestae, speaking generally, was the
accident. These declarations were no part of that - were not made at the same
time, or so nearly contemporaneous with it as to characterize it, or throw any light
upon it. They are purely narrative, giving an account of a transaction not partly
past, but wholly past and completed. They depend for their truth wholly upon the
accuracy and reliability of the deceased, and the veracity of the witness who testi-
fied to them.
Id. at 277; see Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913), discussed at
note 380 supra; Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 252 App. Div. 142, 297 N.Y.S. 216
(2d Dep't 1937), aff'd per curiam, 277 N.Y. 548, 13 N.E.2d 468 (1938), discussed at note 386
infra.
11 47 N.Y.2d at 499, 392 N.E.2d at 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 48. In addition to the fact that
the declaration was prompted by a question, other criteria to be considered in determining
whether the statement was uttered impulsively and without reasoned thought are the nature
of the exciting event, the time span between the event and the statement and the interim
activities of the declarant. Id. at 497, 392 N.E.2d at 1231, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
"I Unfortunately, however, the Court failed to take the opportunity to expressly repu-
diate the highly criticized narrative standard employed by Greener. See E. FISCH, supra note
359, § 1001, at 579; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1756, at 163. Nonetheless, the Court never
used the term "narrative" but merely confined itself to the factors that are relevant to
spontaneity, see note 384 and accompanying text infra, and appears to have been concerned
only with excluding the possibility of reflective declarations. 47 N.Y.2d at 497, 392 N.E.2d
at 1231, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 47. This has been the approach of the Court in recent cases. See
People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 231, 342 N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 699 (1975);
People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 72, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468-69 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); note 382 supra.
"I It is submitted that the use of a narrative standard to review spontaneity would bar
the majority of spontaneous statements since they typically are uttered after the fact. See
People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-68 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1756, at 163; 32 CORNELL L. Q.
115, 120 (1946); 54 MICH. L. REV. 133, 136 n.15 (1955); 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1100, 1108-10 (1956).
Indeed, the narrative standard has generated much confusion among the courts in cases
involving spontaneous declarations. An example of a decision that apparently can be ex-
plained only as the product of this confusion is Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp.,
252 App. Div. 142, 297 N.Y.S. 216 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd per curiam, 277 N.Y. 548, 13 N.E.2d
468 (1938). There, the deceased was dragged for five blocks along an elevated trolley, suffered
innumerable fractures and lacerations and finally was dropped to the street level in a state
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Addressing the excited utterance as an exception separate and
distinct from the res gestae doctrine, the Court has identified man-
ageable and realistic guidelines for assessing the spontaneity of
statements elicited in response to a question. Whether the respon-
sive declarations of a bystander will be deemed admissible has not
been addressed, 8' but it is submitted that where the totality of the
surrounding circumstances demonstrates the statements to have
been uttered impulsively, the Edwards rationale should allow their
admission. It is hoped that the criteria announced in Edwards will
be followed in an area of the law most have "approached with a
feeling akin to despair. '388
Stephen H. Perry
of shock. A witness who appeared on the scene in minutes testified to the declaration, "Save
me. Help me - why did that conductor close the door on me?" 252 App. Div. at 143-44, 297
N.Y.S. at 218-19. The statement was excluded by the majority as narrative and not a part of
the res gestae. Id. at 142-43, 297 N.Y.S. at 217. The dissent, however, found it "incredible
that a man so broken in body and so profoundly shocked in mind could have spent the slight
interval before aid arrived in manufacturing a false explanation of the extremity in which he
was found." Id. at 148, 297 N.Y.S. at 224 (Close, J., dissenting).
After Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913), discussed at note
380 supra, some courts had difficulties in excluding hearsay statements when a question had
not been asked of the declarant. E.g., Hill v. Erie R.R. Co., 221 App. Div. 518, 520, 224 N.Y.S.
640, 642 (4th Dep't 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 225 App. Div. 19, 232 N.Y.S. 66 (4th Dep't
1928).
m Cf. People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 342 N.E.2d 496, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1975)
(spontaneous utterance of bystander held admissible).
2' 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 359, § 1745, at 131.
